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Think Tanks: Their Development, 
Global Diversity and Roles in 
International Affairs
Patrick Köllner
The London-based Royal United Services Institute, one of the oldest continuously 
existing think tanks in the world, is celebrating the 180th anniversary of its founding this 
year. Other British and American think tanks with a focus on international affairs have 
been popping up for the past hundred years or so and have strong global reputations.
Analysis
Think tanks have not remained a British or American phenomenon. Rather, thousands 
of think tanks have been founded in many other parts of the world. Still, the term “think 
tank” has remained ambiguous, reflecting the substantial diversity of think tanks’ 
functions and forms.
  While many definitions of think tanks emphasize the public policy focus of such 
organizations, the particular roles that think tanks actually play – either individually 
or as a group within a given context – need to be determined empirically. The same 
holds true for the supposedly positive role think tanks play in civil society.
  The substantial diversity of think tanks around the globe reflects external parameters 
such as the general character and dynamics of the political regimes as well as the 
institutional specifics of the political systems under which think tanks operate, 
the particular “demand” for their services in different contexts, the availability of 
funding, the importance of other “suppliers” of policy-relevant knowledge, as well 
as the initiative and leadership of individual think tank-based policy entrepreneurs. 
  Think tanks can play a multitude of roles in international affairs – for example, they 
can provide opportunities for interactions and discussions among professionals 
within and across national borders; raise awareness and help set relevant agendas; 
inform and defend the foreign policies of individual states; engage in informal 
diplomacy; and nurture next-generation scholars and practitioners of international 
affairs. 
Keywords: think tanks, public policy, civil society, international relations
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Why Think Tanks Matter 
Though widely used, the term “think tank” has es-
sentially remained a “slippery” or “ambiguous” 
one (Stone 1996: 17, 27; Weaver and McGann 2000: 
4-5). Reflecting the substantial diversity in the 
forms they take and the roles they assume within 
and across different national and transnational 
contexts, there simply is no consensus as to what 
constitutes a think tank. Still, at the core of 
most definitions of think tanks is their role with 
respect to informing public policy. For example, 
Suzuki (2006: 1) parsimoniously defines a think 
tank as an “organization that conducts public 
policy research.” A recent, more elaborate – and 
demanding – definition put forward by McGann 
(2011: 13) postulates that “think tanks are public 
policy research, analysis and engagement 
institutions that generate policy-oriented research, 
analysis and advice on domestic and international 
issues that enable both policy makers and the 
public at large to make informed decisions about 
public policy issues.”
Do think tanks deserve public and scholarly 
attention as well as scrutiny? We think so for a 
number of reasons. First, think tanks can serve as 
institutional links between ideas, knowledge and 
public policy. Diane Stone (1996: 1) has noted that 
while ideas constitute the “most intangible aspect 
of political life,” they undoubtedly matter in 
politics. Usually, however – efforts of individuals 
notwithstanding – ideas need to be embedded 
in and diffused by means of an organizational 
infrastructure to be able to impact national and 
international politics. Think tanks can provide 
that organizational infrastructure. Looking at 
the public policy role of think tanks from the 
perspective of national executives, Kent Weaver 
and James McGann have pointed to the need 
for expertise in governmental decision-making: 
In both “information poor and information rich 
societies,” they suggest, policy-relevant informa-
tion is needed that is “understandable, reliable, 
accessible, and useful” (Weaver and McGann 2000: 
2). Alongside bureaucracies and academia, think 
tanks can also be a source for such information. 
Ideal-typically, think tanks thus serve as a “bridge 
between knowledge and power” (Stone 2005: 40-41). 
In principle, think tanks can provide policy 
guidance by contributing to various stages of 
the policy-making cycle, from the agenda-setting 
phase to the evaluation of policy implementation. 
Whether they in fact do so is a matter for empirical 
investigation. At least in the U.S. context, think 
tanks have functioned with respect to policy-
making and the broader policy-making system as 
sources of basic research and advice, evaluators 
of policy proposals and government programs, as 
“facilitators of issue networks and the exchange 
of ideas,” as interpreters of policies and current 
affairs for the media, and also as suppliers of 
personnel (Weaver/McGann 2000: 5-6; Weaver 
1989: 568-570). Yet, as Stone (2004: 14) cautions, 
think tanks are in some cases simply “symbolic of 
intellectual authority that can be used to support 
entrenched policy prejudices and political causes.”
Apart from their potential role in policy-making, 
there is also another empirical if not normative 
reason why think tanks are of academic and public 
interest. Especially in the burgeoning literature on 
democratic transitions and consolidation, think 
tanks have often been portrayed as an important 
element of civil society (Weaver/McGann 2000) or 
have even been regarded as a “tool for democracy” 
(Suzuki 2006: 1). McGann (2011: 14) has recently 
gone as far as to suggest that the existence of think 
tanks “contributes to the creation of a robust civil 
society. In turn, the existence of a robust civil 
society strengthens the existence of think tanks, 
creating a ‘virtuous cycle’ of consolidation.” The 
underlying logic of this is simple – and thus prone 
to simplification: a vibrant civil society contributes 
to a functioning democracy, and think tanks are 
a crucial part of civil societies. Therefore, think 
tanks contribute to or even foster democracy and 
can, at times, also play vital roles in the transition 
to democracy. Such assumptions – especially 
popular in the 1990s, the heyday of euphoria about 
a new dawn of worldwide democratization – 
have been increasingly questioned by empirical 
studies. These studies point out that civil society 
organizations in different national contexts do not 
necessarily serve as a bulwark against autocracy 
or as crystallization points for democratization 
movements but may also reflect overall regime 
structures and dynamics and thus actually be 
regime-sustaining rather than regime-challenging 
(e.g. Jamal 2009). Still, think tanks can in principle 
promote civic participation in public affairs and 
thus can contribute to pluralism and “help to 
restrain the monopolisation of politics” (Suzuki 
2006: 1). Whether this is the case in specific contexts 
is again a matter for empirical investigation. 
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Think Tank Development: U.K. and U.S.-based 
Exemplars and Global Diversity
Think tanks are not a new phenomenon in 
national polities and international relations. In 
fact, the origins of individual think tanks in the 
United States and the United Kingdom can be 
traced back to the early years of the twentieth 
century, which saw the founding of institutions 
such as the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace (1910), the Brookings Institution (1916) and 
the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR, 1921) in 
the U.S., and the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs (also known as Chatham House, 1920) 
in the U.K. In particular, CFR and Chatham 
House served as inspirations, if not institutional 
blueprints, for a number of international affairs 
think tanks set up in Europe and elsewhere from 
the 1930s onward. During World War II, these 
institutes, which are today considered part of 
the venerable “old guard” of international affairs 
think tanks (Higgott and Stone 1994: 17-19), got 
“drafted” into government service in the context 
of the Allied war effort. 
The post-World War II period saw a burst 
of think tank operations of varying scale and 
scope, with some new institutes specializing in 
narrowly defined policy niches, and others in 
broad areas with public policy relevance. In the 
U.S., some of the biggest think tanks such as 
the Rand Corporation and the Hudson Institute 
emerged and began to thrive in the Cold War 
environment, with close links to the Pentagon 
and the defense establishment at large. The 1970s 
and 1980s then witnessed the emergence of more 
ideologically and marketing-oriented institutions, 
in particular in the U.S., where, among others, the 
conservative Heritage Foundation soon made its 
presence felt on the national policy-making scene 
(Rich 2004: 41-73). But think tanks did not remain 
an American or British phenomenon, but rather 
came to constitute an institutional species that 
has adapted to the environments of an increasing 
number of countries with their specific political, 
cultural and legal cultures. While most think tanks 
are firmly rooted in their national contexts and 
cater mainly to domestic audiences, accelerated 
globalization since the 1990s, abetted by vast 
advances in international communications, has 
also affected think tanks, which have expanded 
their transnational activities, for instance in terms 
of collaborative linkages and the dissemination 
of research output and policy briefings (Stone 
2005: 70-78). A 2010 international survey counted 
over 6,480 think tanks operating in 169 countries, 
including two in (post-)totalitarian North Korea! 
(McGann 2011).
Given the large number and worldwide 
existence of institutions loosely labeled “think 
tanks,” it is perhaps not surprising that they have 
attracted increasing academic interest, especially 
since the 1990s. Most of the literature has focused 
on think tanks in the U.S. This is hardly surprising 
in view of the fact that a large number of think 
tanks operate in the United States, a country that 
provides a particularly hospitable terrain for their 
operation given the institutional configuration of 
the national political system and its concomitant 
decision-making processes, the permeability of 
government institutions, and last but not least the 
long tradition of philanthropy that has benefited 
non-profit organizations including think tanks 
(Weaver 1989: 570-571; Stone 1996: 40-42). Yet, the 
literature also points out the considerable diversity 
of think tanks operating within the same or across 
different national settings. Think tanks around the 
world diverge in terms of organizational structure, 
modes of operation, audience or market, and 
means of support (McGann 2011: 15; Stone 2004: 
2-5, 2005: 45-46). 
Various attempts have been made to classify 
think tanks in terms of generic types. For example, 
Stone (2005: 48) distinguishes five types of 
think tanks based on their primary institutional 
affiliation or linkage, namely:
• independent civil society think tanks established 
as non-profit organizations,
• policy research institutes located in or affiliated 
with a university,
• governmentally created or state-sponsored 
think tanks,
• corporate-created or business-affiliated think 
tanks, and
• political party (or candidate) think tanks. 
Comparative analyses of think tanks have shown 
that there is “no one best model or trajectory for 
think tank development” (Stone 2005: 50; Weaver 
1989: 576; Weaver and McGann 2000: 32) and that 
the “U.S. experience with think tanks may not be 
readily transferable to other settings” (Weaver 
1989: 577).
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Why Are Think Tanks Around the Globe So 
Diverse?
There is a sizeable literature on the development 
of think tanks and their role in policy-making, in 
particular with reference to the U.S., but also, if 
more limited in size, with respect to a number 
of other national and regional settings. Yet, little 
progress has been made so far in establishing 
coherent, universally applicable frameworks 
for explaining either the overall development 
or the operational profile – in terms of activities 
pursued and roles played – of think tanks in 
different settings. However, the literature provides 
some discussion of environmental parameters 
impinging on the development of think tanks and 
their opportunities to influence policy-making 
processes in different settings. One of the most 
prominent discussions concerns the effects of 
institutional variance of political systems on 
• the qualitative and quantitative development of 
think tanks and 
• their opportunities to affect policy-making. 
Weaver and McGann (2000: 13) note that the 
“structure and operations of political institutions 
are clearly a critical determinant of the level 
of activity and type of think tanks in a given 
country.” More specifically, Weaver (1989: 570) 
argues that think tanks are more numerous and 
“probably” also more influential in the U.S. than in 
other Western democracies “because of a number 
of unusual features of the American political 
system, notably the division of powers between 
the president and Congress, weak and relatively 
non-ideological parties, and permeability of 
administrative elites.” This specific institutional 
setting provides numerous opportunities for 
political entrepreneurs and think tanks to leave 
their mark on policy-making.
Still, there is no substantial evidence that 
parliamentary political systems provide policy 
entrepreneurs with insurmountable institutional 
barriers. Stone (2004: 6) notes that “parliamentary 
systems involve greater centralization of legislative 
power and accountability, supposedly allowing 
for greater control over policy and exclusion of 
external policy actors” and also more disciplined 
parties. Yet, she also suggests that the “differences 
between presidential and parliamentary cultures 
do not appear to present significant differences 
in opportunities” for think tank-based policy 
entrepreneurs (Stone 2005: 60). In the absence of 
systematic and comprehensive testing of these 
issues, it might thus be suggested that while core 
institutional parameters of political systems (e.g. 
parliamentary vs. presidential and unitarian vs. 
federal systems of government, etc.) can facilitate 
or constrain think tank development and their 
opportunities to influence policy-making, they 
do not determine them. Arguing otherwise 
would ignore the abilities of individual agents 
endowed with the necessary leadership qualities 
to overcome or at least “stretch institutional 
constraints” (Samuels 2003: 5-7). 
Institutional features of political systems thus 
constitute only an intervening factor – if an impor-
tant one – with respect to think tank development 
and activities. Numerous other potentially relevant 
factors have been mentioned in the literature on 
think tanks. Stone has presented one of the most 
comprehensive overviews of sociopolitical factors 
shaping the environment in which think tanks 
operate. At the most general level, she notes that the 
“uneven spread of think tank development across 
political systems appears to be a consequence of 
factors such as the extent of foundation support, 
legal structures, the political situation, civil 
society development, and the tax environment” 
(Stone 2005: 58). Elsewhere, Stone (2004: 6) herself 
references further environmental parameters that 
affect the development and activities of think 
tanks, arguing that “constitutional changes and 
government reform, the intensity of political 
debate and opposition, the attitudes of political 
leaders and the political culture of a society open 
and close opportunities for think tanks and policy 
entrepreneurs.” 
It might be possible to inject greater analytical 
clarity into this fuzzy picture of potentially 
relevant factors by distinguishing between 
demand-oriented factors (pull factors) and supply-
oriented factors (push factors) that can shape the 
development of think tanks and their activities 
in different national settings. With respect to 
established democracies in particular, the simple 
market-analogy based model suggested by 
Jongryn Mo seems useful in this regard. Mo (2005) 
proposes that think tank output can be understood 
as a good, for which there are suppliers (think tanks 
and other actors) and consumers (policy makers). 
Incentives affect the supply of and demand for 
think tank services. With respect to the demand 
side, it has been argued that incentives emanating 
from particular electoral systems can stimulate or 
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constrain policy makers’ demands for think thank 
services. In addition, the “demand for policy 
research by political leaders also depends on the 
degree to which they favor the policy-based rather 
than politics-based style of governance” (Mo 2005: 
176). As Stone (2005: 58) suggests in more general 
terms, the particular character of demand “helps 
to explain why different kinds of think tanks have 
emerged” in different national settings.
Looking at the supply side, it is first important 
to ask who, in a specific context, supplies policy-
related research and guidance. Apart from 
think tanks, other relevant actors in this regard 
may include national bureaucracies, individual 
academics, research-oriented NGOs, and even 
international organizations. And, as Mo (2005: 
178) notes, “traditionally, it is the bureaucrats 
who are the main sources of policy advice to 
political leaders.” Stone (2005: 60) seconds that 
“bureaucracies often retain a monopoly on 
policy advice. The strength of bureaucracies has 
implications for the structure and operation of 
think tanks.” Thus, demand for think tank services 
is likely to be higher when the bureaucracy cannot 
meet relevant demand or when the bureaucracy 
is not trusted by policy makers as a source of 
research-based policy guidance. Apart from 
competition among suppliers of policy research 
and guidance, there is also a host of institutional 
and non-institutional factors, which stimulate or 
constrain the supply of policy input and other 
activities offered by think tanks. Relevant supply-
side variables determining the cost of inputs 
and their efficient use include the availability of 
capital (research funding) and labor (well-trained 
researchers). Such factors in turn depend on the 
amount and kind of existing funding sources 
(government money, foundations, individual 
philanthropy) and the attractiveness of careers in 
policy research (in and of itself and as a gateway to 
positions in government and academia). A final set 
of factors that provides incentives or disincentives 
for the supply of policy research and guidance by 
think tanks relates to existing legal frameworks 
providing a) barriers to and/or support for either 
the establishment and operation of such think 
tanks or access to information, important for 
conceiving policy-relevant input and guidance. 
The Roles of Think Tanks in International 
Affairs
The considerable diversity of think tanks around 
the globe is also reflected in the kinds of roles that 
think tanks can play in international affairs. By 
“international affairs” we mean both international 
and cross-national relations, exchanges, and 
interactions, as well as the foreign policy of 
individual nation-states. While the particular roles 
played by think tanks in international affairs will 
differ in specific national (or regional) contexts – 
and perhaps even from think tank to think tank 
within such contexts – it is still possible to identify 
some generic roles that think tanks can play with 
respect to international affairs. In the following, 
we suggest eleven such generic roles (see also 
Higgott and Stone 1994: 24-29).
First, think tanks can provide (sometimes 
regularized) opportunities for interactions and 
discussions among scholars, politicians, bureaucrats, 
media representatives and businesspeople. This 
might be called the “salon function” of think 
tanks, which can help to build national, bilateral, 
regional and/or transnational networks or even 
communities of people working on one level or 
another in international affairs. Think tanks can 
serve in this respect as institutional bridges linking 
different kinds of professionals who share an 
interest in international affairs and can contribute 
to establishing “person-based pipelines” not only 
within national foreign policy communities but 
also across national borders. In some national or 
regional contexts, the think tanks’ salon function 
might even be more important than their policy 
input as this particular function cannot be assumed 
by other (and perhaps more important) actors 
providing policy input, such as bureaucracies.
Second, think tanks can establish, inform and 
(re-)shape public opinion regarding international 
affairs, including foreign policy. Think tanks can 
directly “establish” public opinion in this area by 
commissioning and organizing relevant opinion 
polls, and they can also inform and even (re-)shape 
public opinion by contributing to relevant discourses 
by means of traditional media interventions 
(interviews, op-eds) or more modern ones (blogs 
and other social media tools). Third, think tanks 
can transfer and disseminate knowledge on 
international affairs to a more general public. They 
can do so by means of public forums, publications 
addressed to a broader audience and by engaging 
in “research brokerage” – that is, making relevant 
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academic findings and assessments available 
in ways that non-academics can understand. 
Fourth, think tanks can contribute to raising 
awareness about and/or help people understand 
(emerging) international affairs and global issues 
by addressing those issues in different formats 
including publications, various kinds of forums, 
and media interventions. Besides putting such 
affairs and issues on the radar, think tanks can 
also contribute to setting relevant national and 
cross-national agendas – or they can at least assist 
in doing so.
Fifth, think tanks can engage in informal 
diplomacy activities by organizing or participating 
in semi-official track 1.5 or more autonomous track 
2 processes.  The functions of think tanks that are 
more or less part of the foreign policy apparatus of 
individual governments range from determining 
how much room there is for formal diplomatic 
maneuvers to signaling impending policy shifts 
and “sniffing out” relevant shifts on the other side. 
More generally, think tanks engaged in informal 
diplomacy can help to establish people-based 
pipelines, which can be especially important when 
formal diplomatic relations do not (yet) exist on a 
bilateral level. 
Sixth, and turning to the public policy-oriented 
roles of think tanks, such organizations can be 
sounding boards for policy makers by providing 
informed “second opinions.” While policy makers, 
perhaps more often than not, have formed opinions 
or assessments concerning certain issues, they 
sometimes also like to hear what relevant experts 
have to say about a certain issue or with respect to 
evaluating policy options – especially if the issues 
concerned are complex and the policy options 
involve high risks and/or costs. Seventh, think 
tanks can also directly impact specific foreign 
policy decisions or the general strategic discourse 
in a given national context through (regularized) 
interactions with policy makers or commissioned 
policy advice. This “consultancy function” of 
think tanks probably comes closest to the popular 
understanding and as we have seen above, common 
definitions of think tanks. For many think tanks, 
opportunities to directly impact foreign and other 
public policies may, however, be quite scarce. 
Eighth, it has to be noted that especially (but 
not only) in (semi-)authoritarian regime contexts, 
think tanks can help legitimize existing (or 
emerging) official foreign policy positions of the 
state concerned. Thus, rather than informing or 
evaluating specific internationally oriented public 
policies, think tanks in such instances play only the 
role of “intellectual cheerleader” for their respective 
governments by uncritically endorsing relevant 
policies or policy decisions and providing rationales 
for them from a seemingly neutral perspective. 
Ninth, we can note that individual think tanks 
sometimes also play a self-chosen role in terms of 
exporting – or at least trying to export – specific 
agendas to other countries. Relevant agendas 
are, as a rule, conviction- or ideology-driven and 
include the spread of democracy or “free” markets, 
as well as assisting like-minded organizations in 
other countries like political parties, associations 
and unions. Endowed with sufficient funding and/
or personnel, they might also help to set up other 
relevant think tanks in foreign settings.
Tenth, think tanks can also contribute to 
establishing International Relations and Strategic 
Studies as fields of studies in individual countries. 
They can achieve this by publishing relevant 
journals, by employing staff members who later 
assume relevant professorships, and by offering 
fellowships to researchers from within and outside 
the country. For example, the establishment of 
Strategic Studies in Japan, where “strategy” was 
considered a sort of taboo word in academia after 
World War II, would probably have not taken place 
if it had not been for the nurturing role played by a 
few Japanese think tanks focusing on international 
affairs. This finally leads to the eleventh role that 
think tanks can play in international affairs: They 
can help nurture next-generation international 
affairs practitioners and scholars, for example 
by running diplomatic academies and various 
training programs related to international affairs, 
by offering internships, by staff members teaching 
at universities and other institutions of higher 
education, and by formally supervising Ph.D. 
students and mentoring younger scholars.
As should already be evident but is perhaps 
worth re-emphasizing: Perhaps no think tank 
focusing on or engaged in international affairs will 
play all of the roles sketched out above all of the 
time. The particular roles – and mixture thereof – 
played by think tanks will differ from setting to 
setting, from organization to organization, and also 
across time. Think tanks, regardless of whether 
they are concerned with foreign policy or other 
public policies, are characterized by tremendous 
diversity with respect to the forms and functions 
they assume. In spite of this – or perhaps because 
of this – they are bound to arouse continued 
academic and public interest, and rightly so.
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foreign policy think tanks in the People’s Republic of China.
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